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 A “we” problem for bioethics and the social sciences:  A 
response to Barbara Prainsack 
 
Abstract 
 
In her article "The We in the Me: Solidarity in the Era of Personalized Medicine,” Barbara 
Prainsack develops an earlier interest in the relationship between solidarity and autonomy 
and the way that these notions operate once passed through the lens of bioethical thought 
and practice.  In his response to this article, Simpson introduces the perspective of two 
South Asian physicians on these issues.  The piece highlights issues of personhood upon 
which the informed consent transaction is based and draws attention to the culturally 
specific versions of how people conceive of relationality, duty, care and the obligations they 
feel they owe to others.  The piece highlights the pronomial shifts between the “we” and the 
“me” and the way that these dispositions emerge in socio-politically configured spaces.  By 
paying careful attention to the settings and situations in which the movements between 
different positions actually take place, the ways in which the fabric of ethical life is made 
rather than simply given is revealed.  Ethnographic inquiry is seen as crucial in understanding 
this process because it points to disjunctions between the categories that we are provided 
to apprehend the world and what it is actually like to live in that world. 
  
 
 
Over quite a number of years I, a social anthropologist interested in bioethics, have 
been in dialogue with two doctors from South Asia.  One is a professor of physiology 
in a university medical school in North India and the other is a senior consultant 
physician in a teaching hospital in southern Sri Lanka.   They are both well trained in 
“western” medicine as well as the tradition of medical ethics that is mostly associated 
with it.  In my estimation they talk sensibly and knowledgeably about the Hippocratic 
Oath, Nuremburg Code, Helsinki Declaration and the subsequent refinements of these 
in notions of autonomy and informed consent as they feature in contemporary 
therapeutic and research encounters.   However, they have often spoken of a difficulty 
they have as doctors and medical educators when working in a South Asian context.  
What they need to do to be “ethical” in the sense mapped out by a western medical 
ethics does not sit comfortably with how they feel they should practice as doctors 
working in an Asian setting.   Something doesn’t quite fit.  If they had read Barbara 
Prainsack’s  “The ‘we’ in the ‘me,’” they would have no doubt been helped, as I was, 
to understand the nature of this conundrum.  The article pinpoints how the 
relationship between the autonomous, rational, skin-bound individual “as the central 
bearer of agency in Western thought” may obscure and elide important dimensions of 
experience and understanding that people bring along with them when they engage 
with the practitioners of western biomedicine in Asian settings.  My doctor friends 
feel it important to point out that talk of autonomy is problematic because 
personhood, for them and their patients, is also relational and distributed in ways that 
are markedly “other-directed,”  to use Prainsack’s term.  They might also be rather 
bemused to learn of the concerns about “personalized medicine” given that many of 
the indigenous healing traditions of South Asia, such as Ayurveda, begin explicitly 
with the person in establishing the most appropriate treatment and not with diseases 
and active ingredients.  As practitioners, the issues raised in her paper are precisely 
the points where culturally specific ideas of kinship, care, duty, solidarity and the 
body as a site for the management of these sentiments necessarily comes into view.  
Moreover, in this other-directed embodiment there appears to be a different kind of 
ethical register than the self-directed one they find in the global episteme of medicine 
and the ethics which it carries.   The article would thus have helped them frame more 
effectively their concerns about the absence of these important referents of the person. 
In other words, there is a “we” in the “me” which, for them, is falling problematically 
out of vision.  However, there remains the problem of what to do with these concerns 
other than simply frame them. In this short response to Prainsack, I want to follow a 
line of flight which doesn’t just posit static categories in perennial opposition but 
draws attention to the movement between them––what this is, how it comes about and 
with what consequences. What I offer is thus more of a comment about the 
relationship between methodology and critical hermeneutics than a quest for psycho-
philosophical verities: the person is not a category but a predicament and the ethical is 
not simply a given but is emergent within biomedical encounters. In what follows, I 
attempt to map out this crucial distinction. 
 
Let us begin with Carrithers’ insightful elaboration upon Mauss’ classic essay on the  
notions of person and self  (Mauss 1985; Carrithers 1985).    In a carefully argued 
critique of Mauss he interrogates the terms person and self or, more precisely, the 
personne and the  moi.  The moi he describes as referring to conceptions of the self 
within a wider cosmos and as typically used to reference an inner life that is 
individualistic in its formation.  He defines the personne as “the social and legal 
history of the individual in respect to society as a whole” (ibid: 235).   What is 
distinctive about this aspect of the person is the extent to which it reflects the “ordered 
collectivity” of which he or she is a member.  In elaborating these concepts, Mauss 
was intent on making a specific point about the moi, namely that it had appeared at a 
particular point in history.  Using textual evidence from fifth century India, Carrithers 
demonstrates that this was not the case.  Moreover, he concludes that it is difficult to 
divorce the outward-looking, social individual from the inward-looking, psychic 
individual in the ways that Mauss attempted in his essay.   What for Mauss began as a 
simple Durkheimian oscillation between the individual and society begins to look like 
a much more complex dialogue between consciousness and history. In ethnographic 
terms, the relationship between moi-theories and  personne- theories  needs to be 
carefully specified if it is to be understood  (Laidlaw 2014:38-9).   
 
One such specification is offered by the social anthropologist Michael Lambek who, 
in a recent essay, has drawn attention to two kinds of personhood:  the forensic and 
the mimetic (Lambek 2013).   He traces the notion of the person as “forensic” back to 
the seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke, who used this term to 
designate the temporally continuous and rationally accountable person.  This is the 
“modern” person believed capable of making contracts that will endure through time 
and for which he or she will remain morally and legally accountable.  Similar 
presumptions lie at the core of the consent procedures that feature in medical- and 
bio- ethics.  In these contexts, the forensic person is the one who is deemed capable of 
autonomous, intentional, self-originated decisions and, moreover, can appreciate their 
consequences at subsequent points over time as that same person.  Indeed, doubts 
about this particular competence provide grounds for over-riding or reallocating 
authority to provide informed consent.  By contrast, Lambek introduces the idea of 
the mimetic person.  Whilst this term is in many ways problematic, it references an 
important aspect of what it means to be a person.  The term is intended to capture the 
routine and performative aspects of human social life which entail “embodied 
articulation unmediated by conscious reason” (Lambek  2013:848).  In our everyday 
lives we can be “ourselves” in response to other persons and in multiple roles and 
subject positions.  These responses work at different scales; sometimes they might 
work together and other times they may not. Carrithers suggests that an individual 
who was a Christian and a German citizen in Nazi Germany may have felt an 
uncomfortable discrepancy when it comes to containing obligations to other citizens 
and to the state (Carrithers 1985:236).  A more recent example can be drawn from the 
Charlie Hebdo massacre. In response, many people around the world were moved to 
carry placards proclaiming “I am Charlie” as a mark of solidarity with people opposed 
to the suppression of free speech.  As a counter-response, many Muslims around the 
world carried placards proclaiming “I am not Charlie” in order to express their 
solidarity with those offended by cartoon representations of the prophet Muhammed.    
The business of protesting and counter-protesting suggests some complex operations 
of differentiation and collectivization in which the mimetic and forensic aspects of 
persons are brought into play as subjectivity continually unfolds within a single life 
lived in relation to the lives of others.    
 
What is important to note in this brief reprise of Carrithers and Lambek is  the 
essentially duplex nature of personhood.  In the constitution of persons, both 
dimensions––forensic and mimetic, continuous and discontinuous, individual and 
collective, fixed and malleable––are in play or, as Carrithers would have it, in 
conversation (ibid 255).   Second, in these conversations we need to pay careful 
attention to the circumstances in which the pronomial register shifts, making one 
identification predominate over another.  These are the points at which the “we” in the 
“me” might be made visible such as when people participate in religion, ritual, 
kinship and community or, perhaps, a Charlie Hebdo march or counter-demonstration, 
and perhaps experience a sense of mutuality and connection as a result.  Moves might 
also go in the opposite direction, as when the “I” is recovered from the “we” and a 
person makes a stand against collectively endorsed injustice or oppression.1   
Pronouns, it would seem, and how we get from one to another in practice, is 
something to which we should pay careful attention  (Fernandez 1986; Carrithers 
2008).  Before considering this idea of pronomial movement in more detail, let us 
return to the idea of informed consent which is the starting point for Prainsack’s 
discussion.  
 
Informed consent has a long history.  One point of sharp focus in this history was the 
trial of doctors accused of vile and systematic abuse within the Third Reich––to make 
globally and eternally visible each individual “me” that made up the “we” of 
totalitarianism. The full extent of their crimes was brought to the attention of the 
world in the so-called doctors’ trials that began at Nuremburg on 19th August 1947.  
Among other things, an outcome of the trial was the Nuremburg Code.  This code 
would ensure that state power would never again be able to strip away rights, identity, 
citizenship and nationhood to create a condition of absolute and abject vulnerability in 
which people could be reduced to a state of “bare life” (Agamben 1998: 171).  In 
future, such acts of de-humanization perpetrated in the name of science and medicine 
would be avoided by making freely-given, informed consent the first premise of all 
biomedical and research transactions involving human subjects.   In the present day, 
this crucial transaction has evolved into a ritual of passing back and forth information, 
forms and signatures, which signal that human subjects are being treated as ends in 
themselves and not merely as the means to an end. In ideal terms, informed consent 
might thus be seen as effecting a reversal of the power relation between the doctor 
and the research participant/ patient such that the latter is now in the ascendant (Kelly 
2003:184).  Yet, what is going on in practical terms?  One of the main things that I 
would suggest is happening is that people are being asked to think. They are being 
asked to process information, options and consequences for themselves and for others.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that thinking is a notoriously unruly and highly 
discursive process, thinking in the context of informed consent procedures has been 
interrogated only minimally.   
 
Following Arendt, and her posthumously published meditations on “The Life of the 
Mind,” we might consider thinking as taking one of two forms: the “two in one,” that 
is, thinking in isolation, or the “dialogue of thought,” that is, thinking with the help of 
others (Arendt 1971).   Sticking with Arendt for a moment, this formulation makes the 
procedure for informed consent not merely a passive inoculation against vulnerability 
but an educative act and therefore a political one. As Arendt puts it: “if …().. the 
ability to tell right from wrong should turn out to have anything to do with the ability 
to think then we must be able to ‘demand’ its exercise from every sane person, no 
matter how erudite or ignorant, intelligent or stupid he happens to be” (ibid 13).  As 
such, the act of eliciting informed consent is one in which certain aspects of 
personhood become fixed, rather in the way that a photographic image is fixed in the 
developer’s tray: it provides evidence of something beyond itself.   I would suggest 
that the image that appears is of the forensic person, that is, the one that will be held 
to account or, indeed, will be capable of holding others to account for things done to 
them in the future.  What is not easily reckoned with in this particular mental process 
is Arendt’s second kind of thinking, the kind that goes on together with others. This 
is, the other-directed thinking that is woven into the dense fabric of a person’s 
connections with kin, community and surroundings. This kind of thinking brings in 
the day to day being with others and the attendant skills of reading their thoughts, 
action and intentions. At root, the difficulty of incorporating this dimension into 
contemporary bioethics is a very important intellectual problem for Prainsack and me 
but, for my Asian doctor friends, it is also a very practical one. 
 
Prainsack’s two examples are instructive when it comes to getting further into the 
nature of this problem.  Her first example draws on an ethnography produced by 
Koenig & Gates-Williams and is set in multicultural San Francisco.   They point out 
that there are protocols that doctors must follow as their patients begin to reach the 
end of their lives.  These directions ensure that, in Agamben’s terms, the weak and 
vulnerable are not treated as “bare life” by unfeeling medical practitioners.  The 
unintended consequence pointed out by Prainsack is that distress is caused by seeming 
to deny the importance of people and things that are manifestly important to the 
patient.  The problem is presented by Prainsack in terms of a “clash” between 
“protocols” and “social and cultural norms.” However, I would suggest that this is 
rather more than a “clash.”  It arises out of the cultivation of a kind of thinking in 
which the objective is to make a particular kind of person appear.  This is the kind of 
person that is integral to the functioning of the modern state and upon which the idea 
of rights that are distinctively “human” are built and elaborated (cf. Grear 2006; 
Yeatman 2000).   Without such persons the rational, jural, liberal, bureaucratic 
principles on which large political and economic formations depend would cease to 
function.  In Lambek’s terms, these are persons who, however fleetingly, are rendered 
forensic, continuous, individual and fixed.  For people to engage with this process it is 
to be caught in a gaze that is not easily evaded, as it is deeply imbricated in the 
institutions that hold modern states together.  For ethnic minorities in San Francisco 
or Asian doctors trained in western medicine and practicing in their home countries, 
there is an uncomfortable tension lurking here.  Participation in the rituals of informed 
consent appear to invite internal thinking and, to use Foucauldian coinage, invites new 
modes of subjectivation. These changes are brought about in ways that over-ride the 
more familiar and available routes to shared thinking (religion, kinship, community, 
daily practice). For example, in the normal run of things, to be “alone” (taniyama) for 
a Sri Lankan person is an unusual and problematic state.  It has often struck me that 
the act of eliciting informed consent pulls such people into a sense of aloneness at the 
very points of crisis at which they would typically seek to orientate themselves 
maximally to others  (Sariola and Simpson 2011).   In short, the singular, 
transcultural, universal “I” of law, medical ethics and, by extension, human rights, 
must be set apart from the multiplicity of forms that the “we” in which I dwell might 
take.   The rights, citizenship, freedom, autonomy and so forth that guarantee my 
security within the modern nation state may not always sit comfortably with the sense 
of ontological security which I derive and sustain from being with others in the world.    
 
Prainsack’s second example takes up the theme of organ donation and points to 
another set of important pronomial shifts.  Typically, the educative intent in relation 
to this practice has been to move people from “me” to “we.”  That is, to voluntarily 
connect a person’s organs and tissues through altruistic acts of gifting to the broader 
imaginaries of nation, people, and community. Blood donation as outlined by Titmuss 
is the classic paradigm of this version of altruistic giving.  However, the 
circumstances to which Prainsack draws our attention render the act of donation 
significantly more complicated.  On the one hand, she refers to kidney donation, an 
act that is altogether more costly in physical and emotional terms than blood donation. 
On the other, she discusses cases of directed donation, that is, ones where there is 
something more than “society” as the endpoint, as donor and recipient may well be in 
a relationship that is known or specifiable.   The “we” that might come into view here 
is clearly not, in Prainsack and Buyx’s terms, the “tier 3” solidarity of an imagined 
nation of the kind that Titmuss had in mind.  On the contrary, directed-donation seems 
to hover problematically between their “tier 1” solidarity (between individuals) and 
“tier 2” solidarity  (within groups and communities) and, furthermore, does so in ways 
in which self-interest and altruism become difficult to delineate (Prainsack & Buyx 
2011; also see Kaufman 2014).  The rhetorical push here is therefore not to realize the 
“I” in the “we” (that is, to highlight the forensic person against a backdrop of 
quotidian and fluid practices) or the “we” in the “me” (that is, to foreground aspects 
of the mimetic person that might otherwise be lost in the workings of bureaucracy), 
but rather to track carefully and in detail the realization of one kind of “we” within 
another kind of “we” (that is, to move the person between different mimetic registers).  
Such moves are of great methodological interest because they signal a kind of world 
building or human becoming that ethnography is ideally suited to capture.   They 
relate to scales that are often lost in the traffic of macro-structural processes.  
Prainsack gives a striking example:  Sandra, an American Christian woman, who, 
upon reading of Yitzhak, an Israeli man with kidney disease, hears an instruction from 
God and offers Yitzhak her kidney, which, after some deliberation by an Israeli 
hospital ethics committee, is gratefully accepted as an “altruistic” gift. Thereafter, 
Sandra and Yitzhak enjoy a very literal sense of connection.  In other words, these are 
moves that often confound the vertical moves that bring persons into existence as 
citizens and rights-bearing individuals and which are presumed to be regulated, 
shaped and mediated by the institutions of law and medicine in large scale state 
formations.    
 
My two doctor friends would have followed this line of argument with interest.  They 
understand the importance of the forensic person in the work that they do but are also 
aware of the acts of sublimation they must perform on their patients in making it appear.  
Left behind are actions, relationships and solidarities typically expressed in familiar 
idioms of culture, religion, kinship and community.  They would agree with Prainsack 
that this is a problem with “the Western focus on self-interested independent 
individuals” and not with autonomy per se.  Where they would differ is in two important 
respects.  First, in the contexts in which they operate, the highly individualized version 
of ethics that comes with Western medicine can offer little in the face of the gross 
inequities, neglect, mal-distribution of resources and corruption with which public 
medical systems across South Asia must contend. Gupta puts his finger on the problem 
in his ethnographic account of the ways in which Indian bureaucracy causes large 
numbers of people to perish for want of food, health care and basic sanitation and 
despite the avowed intent of the post-colonial state to serve its people to rather different 
ends (Gupta 2012). These concerns originate in the kind of structural inadequacies in 
baseline public health provision that do not generally trouble doctors working in more 
affluent settings. The second difference takes us back once again to the question of 
informed consent and the kinds of care that this transaction has come to signal. A useful 
distinction to introduce at this point is between the notion of “caring about” and “caring 
for.” This distinction has been elaborated in the context of organ donation in a recent 
essay by Atkinson, who outlines acts of “caring-for” as responses to known and 
proximate others whereas “caring-about” typically references concerns beyond the 
immediacy of everyday lives (Atkinson 2016).2  Put simply, where informed consent is 
concerned, doctors must first signal that they “care about” the forensic person before 
they can begin to “care for” the mimetic person they have before them. The Asian 
doctors’ concern is that, in their world, they might end up being drawn into “caring 
about” when “caring for” is what they feel they should be practicing, as well as 
preaching.    
 
In responding to Prainsack’s article, I have argued, like her, that reflecting on the “we” 
in the “me” is an important starting point for a critique of bioethics.  Using the voice of 
my Indian doctor friends, I have tried to take things further by highlighting some of the 
complexities that underpin this important pronomial shift. First, the “we” is shot 
through with culturally specific versions of how people conceive of relationality, duty, 
care and the obligations they feel they owe to others.  Second, the “me” from which 
these dispositions arise is not a stable or constant but is itself highly variable and 
situated.  Third, both the “we” and the “me” emerge in socio-politically configured 
spaces.  Paying careful attention to the settings and situations in which movements 
between these different positions actually take place reveals the ways in which the 
fabric of ethical life is made rather than simply given.  Finally, the work of ethnographic 
inquiry is important in understanding this process because it points to disjunctions 
between the categories that we are provided with to apprehend the world and what it is 
actually like to live in that world  
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Lienhardt offers an account of how the Dinka of Southern Sudan conceptualize the self. 
Through an analysis of proverbs and folktales as well as his personal encounters with 
the Dinka he charts something like a Dinka conception of the self in relation to the 
collectivities that typically elide more individualistic accounts of personhood in small-
scale traditional communities (Lienhardt 1985). 
 
2. I am grateful to Claudia Merli for pointing out an earlier genealogy of this distinction, 
which goes back to Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world (dasein) and was built 
on the idea of caring for others.  The notion was subsequently taken up in feminist 
analyses to signal an appropriation of “caring for” in the face of “caring about” as the 
more detached responsibilities implicit in patriarchy (Maihofer 1998).   
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